19 Wells off Garden Route: ONO Demands Answers
The following is ONO’s comment on the draft report for Block 11B/12B offshore of the Garden Route, which will involve19 wells in turbid, deep water, drilled through as many as seven campaigns over approximately 11 years, followed by 20–30 years of gas production. It includes major subsea infrastructure, an offshore production facility, 100 km to shore offshore pipeline, with a 13 km onshore pipeline and 1.5 km ‘micro-tunnel’ beneath the coastal zone, condensate exports and, alternatively, a floating offshore Liquid Natural Gas facility with export of LNG and condensate by tanker.
COMMENTS ON THE MAIN ST 1549 DRAFT SCOPING REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (ESIA) FOR THE PROPOSED OFFSHORE GAS & CONDENSATE PRODUCTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORISATION APPLICATIONS FOR BLOCK 11B/12B. REF 700.000130.00001
….Whilst we appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Main ST 1549 Draft Scoping on the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment report (DESIAR) and proposed offshore gas and condensate production and environmental authorisation applications for Block 11B/12B, this objection builds upon concerns previously submitted by ONO during the 2022–2023 TotalEnergies environmental assessment process, many of which remain unresolved or require renewed examination under the substantially expanded development now proposed.
- INTRODUCTION: Increasingly indefensible industrialisation of South Africa’s marine environment
1.1 ONO objects to the proposed development and to the grant of an Environmental Authorisation for it. South Africa’s need for development is real, but it does not establish a need for offshore oil and gas expansion. That proposition requires its own evidence and justification, and the applicant should be required to provide it.
1.2 ONO’s concerns rest on three interrelated legal foundations: section 24 of the Constitution, the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) and the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008 (ICMA). Section 2 explains how we say they apply.
2. LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 The NTS (p. 3) refers to the EIA Regulations and the need for permission from the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources. It does not mention ICMA, the animal wellbeing provisions of the Biodiversity Act, the Climate Change Act or the Marine Spatial Planning Act. These omissions raise important questions about the legal framework governing the assessment.
2.2 Coastal public trust (ICMA). Ownership of coastal public property vests in the citizens of South Africa and is held in trust by the State (s 11), which is the public trustee (s 12). The coastal protection zone exists, among other purposes, to protect the ecological integrity and natural character of coastal public property, to maintain the natural functioning of the littoral active zone and to maintain the productive capacity of the coastal zone (s 17). As amended in 2014, ICMA defines “coastal waters” by reference to internal waters, territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, and the “coastal zone” includes coastal waters. The offshore field, the pipelines and the shore crossing are therefore not outside ICMA’s concern. This coastline is not a receptor of offshore pollution; it is part of one connected marine and coastal system.
2.3 Sustaining the Wild Coast NPC and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others [2026] ZACC 33 (14 August 2026). The Constitutional Court dealt with an offshore exploration right granted under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act. It upheld the appeals, set aside the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order and replaced it with an order dismissing the appeals against the High Court, which had set aside the decisions. The reasoning treated the failures to consider climate change and the precautionary principle as legality defects in their own right, alongside the High Court’s finding that the Minister had to consider ICMA, and the Court declined to treat deferral of consultation to a later stage as an adequate remedy. The Court also held that job creation, though a legitimate consideration, cannot be assumed to be beneficial without asking who receives the jobs, how secure they are and what social, ecological and cultural costs affected communities bear (para 132). ONO does not suggest that the judgment decides this application. It does not prohibit fossil-fuel development, and it concerned a different right in a different place. Its relevance is that the duties it identified must shape how this assessment is scoped, so that the process does not merely observe procedure.
2.4 Animal wellbeing (Biodiversity Act). The National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004, as amended by the National Environmental Management Laws Amendment Act 2 of 2022 (in force since 30 June 2023), requires animal wellbeing to be considered in the management, conservation and sustainable use of animals. It defines wellbeing by reference to an animal’s physical, physiological and mental health, its quality of life and its ability to cope with its environment. On 9 October 2026, in South African Hunters and Game Conservation Association v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2026] ZACC 42, the Constitutional Court dismissed a public-participation challenge to these provisions on the ground of unreasonable delay. The provisions remain in force. The Court did not finally determine the challenge on its merits, and ONO does not suggest otherwise.The statutory recognition of animal wellbeing raises an important question for environmental assessment: whether impacts on individual animals’ physiological and behavioural wellbeing are adequately addressed by conventional biodiversity assessments focused primarily on species, populations and habitats. ONO submits that the proposed development’s potential effects on marine animal wellbeing require explicit consideration, including cumulative exposure to industrial disturbance over the project’s operational lifetime.
2.5 Climate change. In Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others [2017] ZAGPPHC 58 (the Thabametsi judgment), the High Court held that climate change impacts must be assessed before authorisation, ideally through a professionally researched climate change impact assessment, even though the EIA Regulations do not say so expressly. The Climate Change Act 22 of 2024 now provides a statutory framework.
2.6 Questions
Q2.6.1. Please list every statute, regulation, plan and authorisation that applies to each project component and phase, including the Environmental Authorisation, the Production Right, any ICMA authorisation (for example a coastal waters discharge permit), and heritage, air quality, marine pollution and shipping approvals. Which authority decides each, and will the decisions be coordinated?
Q2.6.2 Which components (wells, floating facilities, subsea pipelines, the shore-crossing micro-tunnel, the onshore pipeline, support bases) fall within the coastal zone, coastal public property or the coastal protection zone as ICMA defines them? How will the State’s trusteeship duties in ss 11 and 12 and the purposes in s 17 be applied as assessment criteria?
Q2.6.3 How will the reasoning in Sustaining the Wild Coast on meaningful consultation, climate change, the precautionary principle and ICMA be reflected in the terms of reference of each specialist study, the significance ratings, the alternatives analysis and the final recommendation?
2.6.3.1How will the FESIAR avoid treating the existence of an ESIA process as sufficient in itself?
Q2.6.4 Does the applicant accept that the Biodiversity Act’s animal wellbeing provisions apply to the marine fauna the project may affect?
If not, what is the legal reasoning?
If so, how will the ESIA assess the wellbeing of individual marine animals, including physiological stress, acoustic disturbance, behavioural disruption, displacement, interference with communication, feeding and reproduction, and cumulative exposure to industrial activities? What methodologies and specialist expertise will be used, and how will the assessment demonstrate that these impacts can be adequately avoided or mitigated, rather than relying exclusively on population-level biodiversity indicators? (See Section 5.)
Q2.6.5 What obligations arise under the Climate Change Act 22 of 2024 and South Africa’s Nationally Determined Contribution, and how will they inform the need and desirability assessment and the decision?
Q2.6.6 For each specialist study, which legal provisions and judicial findings inform its terms of reference and significance criteria?
Q2.6.7 How will the assessment test the project against the NEMA principles that the environment is held in public trust (s 2(4)(o)), that sensitive and stressed coastal ecosystems require specific attention (s 2(4)(r)), that the costs of remedying pollution fall on those responsible (s 2(4)(p)) and that a risk-averse and cautious approach must be applied (s 2(4)(a)(vii))?
3. NEED AND DESIRABILITY OF THE PROJECT
3.1 The NTS (pp. 3–4) says South Africa relies heavily on coal and imports most of its natural gas, that the project “could” contribute to energy security, that it is not expected to materially influence global hydrocarbon consumption because equivalent supply could come from other producers, that it is a declared Strategic Integrated Project (SIP), and that it “appears, in principle” to align with energy security, development and just-transition objectives. It adds that need and desirability will depend on the ESIA findings.
ONO’s concern is that these are conclusions offered before the assessment. The substitution argument would justify any new fossil-fuel project and sits uneasily with the claimed energy-security benefit. SIP status does not, on its face, determine environmental acceptability. The NTS does not mention the no-go alternative or any alternative way of meeting the stated objectives. And the NTS itself acknowledges (p. 11) that the project will not create many direct jobs and that much offshore work will go to international contractors.
3.2.Questions
Q3.2.1What specific development objectives is the project meant to serve? What evidence shows that new offshore gas production is needed to meet them, over what period and for whose benefit?
Q3.2.2What are the first-gas date, annual production profile, resource estimate and field life, and how certain are they?
Q3.2.3 What share of national gas demand would the project meet, and how does that compare with current imports?
Q3.2.4 Who are the intended off-takers?
Q3.2.5 What is the authorisation, financing and offtake status of the proposed Garden Route gas-to-power facility, and does Scenario 1 depend on it?
3.2.5.1 Under Scenario 2, how much LNG would be exported, and how does export contribute to South African energy security?
Q3.2.6. What evidence supports the statement that equivalent supply would come from other producers if the project does not proceed (p. 3)?
3.2.6.1 Is that consistent with the claim that the project improves energy security? Would the same reasoning justify any new fossil-fuel project?
3.2.6.2 Are non-fossil sources among the “alternative” suppliers?
Q3.2.7 When and by what instrument was SIP status declared,
3.2.7.1 What are its legal consequences for this authorisation,
3.2.7.2 and how will the EIA ensure that it is not treated as determining need, desirability or acceptability?
Q3.2.8 Which reasonable alternatives for meeting the stated objectives have been considered, including renewable generation, storage, grid improvement, efficiency and demand-side measures?
3.2.8.1 How will they be compared with the project on cost, delivery time, employment, emissions and risk?
Q3.2.9 Will the FESIAR assess the no-go alternative, as NEMA s 24(4)(b)(i) requires,
3.2.9.1 including the benefits of avoiding new risks and of redirecting investment?
Q3.2.10 How many jobs will be created, by phase, occupation, duration and place of residence, and how many will go to South African workers and to affected coastal communities?
3.2.10.1 How will the assessment ask, as the Constitutional Court did in Sustaining the Wild Coast, who gets the jobs, how secure they are and what costs communities bear?
Q3.2. 11 Will a full cost-benefit analysis be produced that counts :
3.2.11.1.environmental management,
3.2.11.2.monitoring,
3.2.11.3.emergency response,
3.2.11.4.decommissioning,
3.2.11.5.climate damages
3.2.11.6.and the losses to fisheries, tourism and other marine-dependent sectors,
3.2.11.7.with sensitivity testing for resource, price and cost uncertainty?
3.2.11.8 Who bears the cost if projected benefits do not materialise?
Q3.2.12 What domestic processing, storage, refining and transmission infrastructure is needed to realise the benefits, what is its status?
3.2.12.1 Who will pay for it? ONO has previously drawn attention to constraints in the refining sector (Tutwa Consulting 2021, cited in ONO’s 2023 comments; DMRE 2019).
Q3.2.12 Has the applicant assessed whether new upstream gas development is compatible with the conditions of climate finance, including the Just Energy Transition Partnership, and whether it could put concessional funding at risk?
Q3.2.13 How will the assessment distribute benefits and costs among private investors, the state, workers, coastal communities and future generations, including the risk that the project becomes a stranded asset?
4. CLIMATE CHANGE & GLOBAL WARMING
The NTS lists “contribution to GHG emissions” and health impacts from atmospheric pollution as potential impacts (p. 8) and proposes a GHG and climate change risk assessment (p. 9). It describes about 16 months of surveys and drilling campaigns over about 11 years (p. 4), with some wells tested before completion, but does not state the production period or a first-gas date. ONO understands from the 2022–2023 documents that production of 20 to 30 years was anticipated, which would carry operations well into the 2050s. The question is whether new gas that may reach production only in the 2030s can be reconciled with the emissions reductions required in the same decades? ONO also notes that the NTS does not say whether the significance of the emissions will be assessed, or only quantified.
Questions
Q4.1 What are the project timetable, production profile and expected end of production?
4.1.1 How do these timelines relate to South Africa’s emissions-reduction commitments and global decarbonisation pathways?
Q4.2 What are the project’s anticipated lifecycle GHG emissions, disaggregated by project phase, gas and emissions source? The assessment must include surveys, drilling, well testing and flaring, infrastructure installation, production, processing, liquefaction where applicable, venting, fugitive methane, transport and shipping, decommissioning, and the downstream combustion of extracted gas and condensate. It must distinguish direct operational emissions from indirect and downstream emissions and state the assumptions underlying all estimates.
Q4.3 Will the GHG specialist assess the significance of the project’s emissions, including their cumulative contribution to global warming, rather than merely quantify them?
4.3.1What criteria and methodology will be used to determine significance?
4.3.1 If the proposed assessment intends to quantify emissions without evaluating their significance, what is the justification for this approach?
4.3.2. How would it comply with the principles of climate-impact assessment reflected in the Thabametsi judgment and the DFFE’s 2017 Guideline on Need and Desirability?
Q4.4 Which global warming potential (GWP) metrics will be used to evaluate methane emissions over both 20-year (GWP20) and 100-year (GWP100) time horizons?
4.4.1 How will the assessment communicate the implications of methane’s near-term warming effects alongside longer-term emissions?
4.4.2 What enforceable commitments will the applicant make regarding methane leak detection and repair, emissions monitoring, venting prevention and flaring minimisation?
4.4.3 How will actual performance be verified, reported and independently monitored, and what corrective measures will apply in the event of non-compliance?
Q4.5 How is the proposed development compatible with pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals, particularly the effort to limit warming to 1.5°C, and with the remaining global carbon budget? The assessment must use the latest available published carbon-budget estimates, including the Global Carbon Budget 2025 and any subsequent assessments available when the specialist study is undertaken. It must identify the budget’s reference date, probability of limiting warming, emissions covered, scenarios, time horizons and principal assumptions, and explain how uncertainty is addressed. It must evaluate the project’s cumulative lifecycle emissions, including downstream combustion, in the context of the rapid emissions reductions required during the proposed operational period.
Q4.6 How does the project fit with South Africa’s Nationally Determined Contribution and the Climate Change Actand applicable national climate policies?
Please distinguish between statutory obligations, policy commitments and targets, and the emissions reductions indicated by science-based global pathways. It must explain how the proposed development can be reconciled with these different frameworks rather than assuming that consistency with domestic targets alone establishes compatibility with the Paris Agreement.
Q4.7 How will the risks of carbon lock-in and stranded assets be assessed, including the implications of a 20–30-year production period, the potential for declining demand under credible decarbonisation scenarios, and the risk that capital, infrastructure and skills will be committed to gas rather than lower-emission energy systems?
4.7.1 Will the assessment consider alternative investment pathways and the opportunity costs of the proposed development?
Q4.8 How will projected climate change (sea-level rise, extreme wind and wave conditions, ocean warming) be built into infrastructure design and incident risk (see Section 10)? The assessment must address the implications for infrastructure integrity, the probability and consequences of accidental releases, and the resilience of emergency-response arrangements over the project’s full operational lifetime. See also Section 10.
Q4.9 What emissions from flaring, combustion, venting and other atmospheric releases will be modelled, including the relevant pollutants and their dispersion?
4.9.1.What are the anticipated health implications for coastal communities and workers, and the ecological implications for marine fauna and coastal ecosystems?
4.9.2 How will exposure, cumulative impacts and the limitations of available baseline data be assessed?
Q4.10 How will uncertainty in all of the above be disclosed? Please include uncertainties in production volumes, methane leakage rates, emissions factors, downstream use, future energy demand, climate scenarios and remaining carbon-budget estimates.
4.10.1 Will the underlying data, modelling assumptions and sensitivity analyses be made available for independent scrutiny?
5. MARINE BIODIVERSITY, ANIMAL WELLBEING & ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY
The NTS records that the area east of Cape Agulhas is an important spawning and nursery area for anchovy, sardine, hake, kingklip and squid, with currents carrying eggs and larvae across the region (pp. 5–6). It lists threatened and sensitive seabirds (African penguins, albatrosses and others), whales, dolphins and leatherback turtles, and notes that shallower inshore benthic habitats are classified Endangered and Critically Endangered (p. 6). The survey area overlaps the Kingklip Corals Ecologically or Biologically Significant Area, and the subsea pipeline overlaps Critical Biodiversity Areas and Ecological Support Areas (p. 6). Yet Table 1 (p. 8) lists generic impacts only. It does not name noise, effects on eggs and larvae, seabird interactions, vessel collisions, invasive species, cumulative stressors or animal wellbeing. A “Least Concern” benthic classification (p. 6) describes how widespread a habitat is, not how sensitive or slow to recover it is.
Questions
Q5.1 What baseline data (pelagic, benthic, marine mammal, seabird, turtle, fish, ichthyoplankton) will be used, how old and how representative are they, and where are the gaps?
5.1.1 What new surveys are planned, and how will seasonal sampling fit within the 106-day impact assessment phase shown in Figure 3 (p. 3)?
Q5.2 Which of the species named on p. 6 are threatened, globally and nationally?
5.2.1.How does their seasonal presence line up with the seven drilling campaigns, pipeline installation and operations?
Q5.3 How will effects of noise, discharges and spills on spawning, eggs, larvae and nursery function over the Agulhas Bank be assessed, and what seasonal restrictions will be considered?
Q5.4 What is the fine-scale habitat mapping along each pipeline route and at each drill site?
5.4.1.What is the extent of smothering by cuttings discharged to the seabed (p. 4), anchors and trenching, and the recovery time?
5.4.2.How will burial of about 42 km of pipeline (p. 11) through inshore benthic habitats classified Endangered or Critically Endangered be assessed?
Q5.5 What does the “Least Concern” classification of deep benthic habitat indicate and not indicate about sensitivity, vulnerable marine ecosystems, deep-water corals, canyons and recovery?
Q5.6 What is the extent of overlap with the Kingklip Corals EBSA, and why does the survey area overlap it?
5.6.1.What area of CBA (by category) and ESA does each pipeline option cross?
5.6.2 How far is the nearest Marine Protected Area?
5.6.3 Are pipelines compatible with the management objectives of the CBA categories crossed?
Q5.7 How will the assessment address the wellbeing of individual animals (physical, physiological and mental health, quality of life, ability to cope), rather than relying only on population viability or conservation status?
5.7.1 How will sub-lethal effects, chronic stress, displacement from essential habitat and disrupted feeding, breeding and social behaviour be assessed, and who will review the thresholds used?
Q5.8 How will interactions among noise, physical disturbance, chemical exposure, vessel traffic, lighting and climate stress be assessed together rather than one at a time?
Q5.9 How will lighting, flaring and platform structures be assessed for effects on seabirds and turtles?
Q5.10 How will invasive alien species carried in ballast water and on hulls of rigs, floating facilities and vessels be managed?
Q5.11 Which impacts could be irreversible on human timescales or cause irreplaceable loss, and to what degree can each be avoided, managed or mitigated?
Q5.12 Are biodiversity offsets contemplated for marine or terrestrial CBAs and ESAs? ONO objects to out-of-kind offsets, such as funding research, as compensation for habitat loss: research does not restore a destroyed benthic habitat.
5.12.1 How will the applicant show that any offset is ecologically appropriate, additional, measurable and enforceable, and that the mitigation hierarchy (avoid first) was followed?
6. PROJECT DESCRIPTION, LOCATION & SPATIAL ALTERNATIVES
The NTS describes two scenarios (pipeline to shore, or offshore LNG), two alternative locations for the production facility, several onshore pipeline options (Figure 2) and possible partial development through existing PetroSA infrastructure (p. 1). It gives no coordinates, no subsea pipeline lengths and no decision criteria for the choices still open. Some statements need clarifying: the Block is described as about 75 km offshore at its closest point (p. 1), while the facility and field are described as “more than 65 km” offshore (pp. 7, 11); and the shore crossing is described both as a roughly 1.5 km micro-tunnel (p. 4) and as a pipeline that “will be drilled” through the coastal zone (p. 11).
Questions
Q6.1 What are the coordinates and boundaries of the Production Right application area, the exploration right area, the Paddavissie Fairway, the survey area of interest, both facility locations, each of the up to 19 well locations and each pipeline corridor? Please provide GIS files to registered I&APs.
Q6.2 Which choices remain open (Scenario 1 or 2, facility location 1 or 2, onshore options), what criteria and process will decide them, and when can I&APs comment on the implications before decisions are made?
Q6.3 What are the exact distances from the nearest coastline and from the nearest Marine Protected Area to the Block, the field and each facility location? Please reconcile the 75 km and 65 km figures.
Q6.4 What are the lengths of each subsea pipeline, the trench and burial dimensions, the spoil and plume footprint and the pipeline protection measures?
6.4.1.Is the shore crossing a micro-tunnel or horizontal directional drilling?
6.4.2.What drilling fluids will be used, and what is the risk and consequence of drilling-fluid breakout?
Q6.5 Which existing PetroSA facilities would be used in the “partial development” (p. 1)?
6.5.1What is their authorisation status and will the tie-back be assessed as part of this ESIA?
6.5.2.If it is excluded, how will fragmentation be avoided?
Q6.6 What associated infrastructure is proposed or reasonably foreseeable (the gas-to-power facility, onshore receiving facilities, port and supply bases, helicopter and vessel bases, export tanker routes, ship-to-ship transfer locations), and how will its consequences be assessed?
Q6.7 To the extent the assessment relies on a “maximum footprint” or “assessed envelope”, how will configurations within the envelope be tested?
6.7.1.Ecological significance depends on the location, timing, duration and nature of disturbance, not only the area affected. A smaller footprint through an exceptionally sensitive benthic habitat could do more harm than a larger one elsewhere. How will the assessment avoid assuming that a smaller footprint means lower significance?
Q6.8 What site, layout and technology alternatives were considered (for example subsea tie-back to existing facilities, different facility locations, zero routine flaring, alternative pipeline routes), what criteria and site-selection matrix were used, and why were any rejected?
Q6.9 For the onshore pipeline (up to about 13 km): which Critical Biodiversity Area, threatened ecosystem (Albertinia Sand Fynbos, Hartenbos Dune Thicket), wetland, Key Biodiversity Area and Gouritz Cluster Biosphere Reserve areas does each option cross, and how much of each?
Q6.10 Will the EIA include clear maps, at suitable scales, that superimpose infrastructure on environmental sensitivities and on fishing grounds and customary-use areas?
7. UNDERWATER NOISE, VESSEL TRAFFIC & EXPLOSIVES
The NTS proposes underwater noise modelling (p. 8) but Table 1 does not name noise as an impact. Noise would arise from site and route surveys (p. 4, which ONO understands involve echo-sounders and sub-bottom profilers), drilling over about 11 years, installation, floating facilities, support vessels and tankers, and possibly vertical seismic profiling and explosives. ONO’s 2023 comments objected to the failure to assess cumulative acoustic exposure over a project lasting decades. Exposure assumptions that rely on an animal being exposed for only a short period, or simply moving away, are not a reliable precautionary basis. Displacement from feeding or breeding areas has consequences for populations and for fisheries.
Questions
Q7.1 Please give an inventory of every noise source by phase, with source levels, frequency ranges, duty cycles and durations. It should include multibeam and single-beam echo-sounders, sub-bottom profiler, vertical seismic profiling (please confirm the frequency range), seabed coring, drilling and thrusters, floating facilities, installation, support and shuttle vessels, LNG carriers, helicopters and any explosives. How will combinations operating at the same time be modelled?
Q7.2 Which thresholds and guidelines will be used for marine mammals, turtles, fish and squid, and why? Which South African guidelines apply?
Q7.3 How will cumulative acoustic exposure be modelled over the whole project life and together with other sources in the region?
7.3.1Will cumulative acoustic limits or a regional noise budget be set (Tasker et al. 2010)?
Q7.4 What evidence supports any assumption that animals will leave a noise source, and what are the ecological consequences of displacement from feeding, breeding and migration areas?
7.4.1 Why would exposure assumptions shorter than 24 hours be treated as a worst case?
Q7.5 How will species-specific hearing and behavioural sensitivity be addressed, including baleen and toothed whales, fish and chokka squid?
Q7.6 What exclusion zones, seasonal restrictions, soft-starts, passive acoustic monitoring and independent observers will apply?
7.6.1 Who reviews them, who can order a stop, and what monitoring will detect impacts that are not immediately visible?
Q7.7 Will explosives be used in any phase (for example well abandonment, structure removal, pipeline work or clearance of unexploded ordnance)?
7.7.1 If so, for what purpose, with what mitigation, and who holds or will hold the permits?
Q7.8 How many vessel movements will each scenario generate, on what routes and at what speeds?
7.8.1.How will collision risk, noise and disturbance be assessed for whales, in particular southern right and humpback whales? Existing shipping sets the baseline against which added risk must be measured. It does not justify leaving whale-vessel collisions out of the assessment.
8. ROUTINE DISCHARGES, DRILLING WASTE & CHRONIC POLLUTION
The NTS says drill cuttings are discharged onto the seafloor during the riserless drilling stage and, at later stages, cleaned and released into the water from the drilling unit (p. 4). It says produced water will be “treated and managed in compliance with environmental and regulatory requirements” (p. 5), but does not say whether it will be discharged overboard, or give its volume or composition. Meeting a discharge limit does not mean there is no harm: routine discharges that continue for years can expose marine life to persistent mixtures of contaminants. ONO’s 2023 comments concentrated on accidents. ONO now asks for equal attention to routine, lawful discharges.
Questions
Q8.1 Which drilling fluids will be used (water-based, synthetic or oil-based), with what additives?
8.1.1What volumes of cuttings and fluid will be discharged at each well and stage, what is the seabed footprint, and what are the toxicity, metal content and bioaccumulation potential?
8.1.2 Have zero-discharge options (such as cuttings re-injection or onshore disposal) been considered, and if so where?
Q8.2 What will happen to produced water? What are its expected volume, composition (hydrocarbons, dissolved organics, metals, production chemicals, naturally occurring radioactive material), treatment, discharge point and depth, and discharge standard? Has re-injection been considered?
Q8.3 Will an independent marine ecotoxicological assessment examine chronic, sub-lethal and cumulative exposure, including whole-effluent toxicity, rather than relying on dilution modelling alone?
Q8.4 What other discharges will occur (deck drainage, cooling water and biocides, sewage and grey water, ballast water, hydrotest water and chemicals), and what standards apply? Which ICMA and marine pollution authorisations are required?
Q8.5 How could contaminants accumulate in sediments and organisms, enter food webs and affect commercially and culturally important species, including seafood safety and taint?
Q8.6 What are the assumptions, ocean-current datasets (including the Agulhas Current), validation and limitations of the drilling-discharge and liquid-effluent modelling (p. 8), and will it be independently peer reviewed?
Q8.7 Will recurrent small spills (leaks, transfer losses) be modelled? Short-lived spills can have immediate ecotoxicological effects on marine organisms, and repeated spills may affect ecosystem functioning (Brussaard et al. 2016).
Q8.8 How will solid and hazardous waste be handled, and where will it be disposed of?
9. MAJOR INCIDENTS, SPILL MODELLING, RESPONSE & DISPERSANTS
The NTS says unplanned events “are not expected to occur and have a very low likelihood” (p. 8) but gives no basis. Table 2 recognises spills and leaks from drilling, ship-to-ship transfer and pipeline rupture. The Quantitative Risk Assessment proposed on p. 8 addresses only an onshore gas pipeline rupture. The NTS names no equivalent study for the offshore facilities, subsea pipelines, tankers or well control, and does not mention fire, explosion or LNG hazards. A low probability does not remove the obligation to assess a high-consequence event. ONO’s 2023 comments also questioned a 20-day well-capping assumption, because mobilising and engaging capping equipment in the Southern Cape’s heavy weather could take longer. The Deepwater Horizon blowout in 2010 lasted 87 days.
Questions
Q9.1 What is the evidential basis (incident frequency data, barrier analysis) for stating that unplanned events have a very low likelihood, and how will low-probability, high-consequence events be treated in the assessment?
Q9.2 Which scenarios will be modelled: subsea and surface blowout, loss of well control, vessel collision, failure during ship-to-ship transfer, loss of containment at the floating facility, LNG releases (cryogenic hazard, vapour cloud, fire), subsea and onshore pipeline rupture, chemical release, and more than one event at once?
Q9.3 What release rates, durations and weather and ocean conditions will be assumed? Why were conservatively higher rates not used if the purpose is a worst case?
9.3.1.What is the realistic time to mobilise a capping stack and relief-well rig in South Coast conditions? Please include credible blowout durations longer than 20 days, with seasonal and extreme-weather variability.
Q9.4 Will independent specialists peer review the spill modelling, with all inputs and assumptions disclosed?
Q9.5 Why is the Quantitative Risk Assessment limited to the onshore pipeline?
9.5.1.Will quantitative risk assessment also cover the floating facilities, FLNG and LNG tanker operations, subsea pipelines, drilling and well control, including risks to workers and the public?
Q9.6 What mitigation and contingency plans exist for fire and explosion? ONO points to the January 2012 Chevron Nigeria rig fire and the December 2015 Gunashli platform disaster as indicators of the need. Will the plans be made public?
Q9.7 Where and when would oil reach the coast, and with what probability?
9.7.1.Will the assessment cover the cross-shore distribution of stranded and buried oil, its remobilisation by waves and erosion, and shoreline sensitivity and clean-up planning for the Garden Route coast, estuaries and beaches?
Q9.8 Will the draft Emergency Response Plan and Oil Spill Contingency Plan (including the Blowout Contingency Plan) be released for I&AP comment before any decision?
9.8.1.Do they cover subsea and surface releases, more than one event, response tiers, equipment stockpiles, capping and relief-well capability, vessels, trained personnel, mobilisation times and oiled-wildlife response?
Q9.9 Which dispersants might be used, and what are their composition, toxicity, bioaccumulation and effects through the water column and on the shoreline?
9.9.1.What net environmental benefit analysis supports their use, who decides, and is immediate availability demonstrated?
Q9.10 How far could effects extend beyond the Block, the area of interest and administrative boundaries?
10. AGING INFRASTRUCTURE & THE 2022 PETROSA PIPELINE INCIDENT
The NTS says both scenarios “may be preceded by partial development by connecting to existing PetroSA infrastructure and facilities” (p. 1), and Figure 1 shows the existing PetroSA F-A platform. The age, condition and incident history of that infrastructure therefore become part of this project’s risk. In 2023 ONO asked for an explanation of a 2022 failure of the PetroSA condensate pipeline running from the F-A platform to the Mossel Bay refinery: how much condensate was lost, and how far contamination spread. ONO is not aware that this information has been made available to I&APs.
Questions
Q10.1 Which PetroSA facilities (platforms, pipelines, onshore plant) are proposed for use?
10.1.1 When were they installed, what was the original design life, what is the remaining life, and what is the basis for any life extension?
Q10.2 Please provide inspection, integrity, corrosion, fatigue and maintenance records for those facilities, together with any independent integrity assessment.
Q10.3 What was the cause, volume and composition of the 2022 condensate pipeline release?
10.3.1.What contamination resulted, what remediation and monitoring followed, and what lessons have been applied? Please provide the incident investigation.
Q10.4 What metocean design criteria (extreme wind, wave and current return periods) will be used, and how will projected climate change be included? Mean wind-speed projections are not a sound proxy for extremes; gusts of 40–45 m/s have been mapped along the south-western Cape coast (Kruger et al. 2013).
Q10.5 Who owns, operates and is liable for each existing facility?
10.5.1 What are its authorisation and compliance history, and how will Environmental Authorisation conditions bind infrastructure owned or operated by others?
11. CUMULATIVE IMPACTS & THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
The NTS lists no cumulative impact assessment among the specialist studies (pp. 8–9). Figure 1 shows adjoining Block 9 and existing PetroSA infrastructure. The project would add to existing and foreseeable pressures: other oil and gas activity, seismic surveys, shipping, fishing, coastal development and climate-driven ecological change, in an environment where, globally, 48% of assessed species are declining in population and only 3% are increasing (Finn et al. 2023). ONO has consistently called for a strategic assessment of offshore petroleum development under Operation Phakisa. Without one, successive project authorisations may produce cumulative effects that have never been evaluated together.
Questions
Q11.1 Will a dedicated cumulative impact assessment be done? What are its geographic and temporal scope and the basis for them, and which existing, approved, proposed and reasonably foreseeable activities will it include (Block 9, the F-A complex and other rights, seismic surveys, shipping, fishing, coastal development)?
Q11.2 What information has been sought from other applicants, regulators, research institutions and monitoring programmes?
Q11.3 Where cumulative effects cannot be quantified reliably, how will the uncertainty be explained and the need for precaution decided? How will the assessment ensure that limits to knowledge are not used to exclude potentially significant interactions?
Q11.4 What indicators or thresholds would trigger additional restrictions, suspension or reassessment, and which authority would monitor cumulative impacts across project boundaries?
Q11.5 Has a strategic environmental assessment been done for offshore oil and gas development on the South Coast, or nationally? If not, why not, and how will the project-level assessment deal with the gap? ONO requests one; it does not suggest that it is a statutory precondition.
12. FISHERIES, COASTAL COMMUNITIES, CUSTOMARY RIGHTS & HERITAGE
The NTS says overlap with commercial fishing is “generally limited” and that small-scale fisheries operate within about 15 km of the coast, while the facility and field are more than 65 km offshore (p. 7). It also records that the nearshore survey area and export pipeline overlap the inshore trawl, mid-water trawl, demersal longline, rock lobster and squid fisheries, and the field overlaps the large pelagic longline fishery (p. 7). Table 1 (p. 8) frames fisheries impacts as changes in catch, displacement and loss of income. Tourism appears only in Table 2, as a consequence of an unplanned event. The NTS says little about subsistence use, customary and spiritual relationships with the sea, or effects on recruitment and stocks. People’s relationships with the sea cannot be reduced to settlements or fishing within a fixed distance of the drilling area.
Questions
Q12.1 Which fishing sectors (commercial, small-scale, subsistence, recreational), harbours and communities could be affected, directly or indirectly? What catch, effort, employment and income data by sector support the assessment, and how will unreported and subsistence fishing be captured?
Q12.2 What is the basis for the 15 km figure for small-scale fishing? How will fishers who work beyond it, and communities not adjacent to the project, be identified and engaged?
Q12.3 What safety and exclusion zones apply in each phase and for how long? How will vessel displacement, pipeline free-spans, anchor handling and gear-snagging risks be managed and compensated?
Q12.4 How will effects of noise, discharges and a spill on fish and squid distribution, catchability, spawning and recruitment be assessed beyond displacement, together with market perception of contamination?
Q12.5 What jobs and income will be lost in fisheries, tourism, recreation and hospitality over the life of the project, quantified, including for the Garden Route and Mossel Bay tourism economy?
Q12.6 What baseline will be assembled of indigence, food security and dependence on the sea in the affected municipalities? ONO’s 2023 comments cited 28.3% indigent households in the Garden Route District; please update this. How will losses of subsistence, social structure and community stability be assessed (Palinkas et al. 1993; Fall et al. 2001)?
Q12.7 How will intangible cultural heritage (relationships with the sea, customary practice, spiritual significance, intergenerational knowledge) and tangible heritage (shell middens, fish traps, shipwrecks and other underwater cultural heritage) be assessed, offshore and onshore? How will holders of indigenous and local knowledge contribute?
Q12.8 How will impacts borne by communities that receive little or no direct benefit be identified, and what remedies exist for losses that conventional compensation cannot address?
13. APPLICANT CAPACITY, LIABILITY, INSURANCE, COMPENSATION & DECOMMISSIONING
The NTS says Main Street became the operator after its joint venture partners withdrew in late 2024 (p. 1). NEMA requires the competent authority to consider the applicant’s ability to implement mitigation measures and comply with conditions (s 24O(1)(b)). The NTS says facilities will be removed and areas restored “as far as reasonably possible”, and that some infrastructure “may be left in place” on the seabed (p. 5). Who pays after a major incident or at closure must be answered before authorisation, not after.
Questions
Q13.1 Who owns and controls the applicant, what parent or other guarantees back it, and what are its technical and financial capacity to develop, operate, respond to an incident and decommission? How were the obligations of the former joint venture partners dealt with?
Q13.2 What insurance (types, limits, exclusions) and other financial security will cover a worst-case incident and long-term clean-up? How is liability established if the value of the coastline has not been quantified? Please provide evidence of cover.
Q13.3 Will an independent valuation estimate the damage to fisheries, tourism, ecosystems and coastal services under the modelled incident scenarios, including the time that recovery and compensation processes take?
Q13.4 How will compensation be determined, by whom, how quickly and with what recourse, for financial, ecological and social losses, including subsistence and cultural losses?
Q13.5 What financial provision under NEMA s 24P and the Financial Provisioning Regulations will be made for rehabilitation, decommissioning and post-closure monitoring, in what form and amount, and how will it be secured against insolvency or transfer of rights?
Q13.6 Please provide a comparative assessment of complete removal, partial removal and abandonment in situ of pipelines, wellheads and structures, covering long-term corrosion, contamination, obstruction and effects on benthic habitat and fisheries. What criteria define the “safest and most environmentally responsible option” (p. 5), and who decides?
Q13.7 Who will remain legally and financially responsible for infrastructure left on the seabed, for how long, and with what monitoring and remedial duties?
Q13.8 How will long-term and intergenerational impacts be weighed against near-term benefits?
14. Specialist studies, independence, uncertainty and precaution
The NTS lists the proposed specialist studies and models on pp. 8–9. They do not include a dedicated cumulative assessment, a quantitative risk assessment for the offshore facilities, an animal wellbeing study, a study of emergency response capability, an economic cost-benefit analysis, or a tourism assessment. Marine mammals, noise and seabirds may fall within marine ecology, but the NTS does not say so. NEMA s 24(4)(b)(iv) requires reporting on gaps in knowledge, the adequacy of predictive methods, underlying assumptions and uncertainties. Figure 3 (p. 3) allots 106 days to the impact assessment phase.
Questions
Q14.1 Who are the specialists, with what qualifications and marine-specific experience? How will independence be safeguarded and conflicts of interest disclosed? Which high-consequence studies (spill modelling, noise, climate, economics) will be independently peer reviewed?
Q14.2 Which of the gaps identified in this submission will be filled by additional studies (cumulative, offshore quantitative risk, marine mammals and noise, seabirds, animal wellbeing, emergency response, cost-benefit, tourism, climate significance, ichthyoplankton)? If any will not, why not?
Q14.3 Will the terms of reference of each specialist study and the PoSEIA’s assessment methodology be released for I&AP comment before the impact assessment begins?
Q14.4 What criteria will rate significance (nature, extent, duration, intensity, probability, reversibility, irreplaceable loss), and how will confidence and uncertainty be incorporated?
Q14.5 How will the assessment distinguish impacts shown to be insignificant from impacts whose significance cannot yet be determined for lack of evidence?
Q14.6 How will the precautionary principle operate as a decision rule where serious or irreversible harm is plausible but cannot be quantified with confidence?
Q14.7 What evidence shows that each proposed mitigation measure works in comparable marine environments, and what residual risk remains after mitigation?
Q14.8 How many seasonal cycles of baseline data can be collected within the 106-day phase? Which 2022–2023 studies will be reused, how old are they, and will they be updated?
Q14.9 Will methods, data, models and assumptions be disclosed to I&APs in time for informed comment, and how will materially conflicting scientific evidence be addressed?
15. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The NTS says all comments will be recorded, responded to and included in the FSR (p. 1). Open days ran from 14 to 22 September 2026 in eight towns from Mossel Bay to Jeffreys Bay, from 15:00 to 19:00 on weekdays (Kareedouw 10:00–14:00, a Saturday), with a single online session on 1 October 2026 from 13:00 to 15:00 (Table 4, p. 10). The full report is held at seven libraries and the NTS alone elsewhere (Table 3). The full DESIAR is in English only (p. 9). There was no open day in Still Bay or Gouritsmond, although the onshore area lies between Mossel Bay and Gouritsmond (p. 7). ONO’s 2023 comments, with Annexures A and B which ONO asks to be read into this submission, documented that councillors announced jobs to draw people to meetings, that many participants said they attended because they expected jobs, that a councillor intimidated participants at the Thembalethu meeting without effective intervention, and that inputs critical of the project were left off flipchart notes and declared invalid.
Questions
Q15.1 What is the status of the 2022–2023 ESIA and its public participation process? Given that numerous interested and affected parties (I&APs) submitted comments and objections during that process, how will the applicant ensure that this substantial body of public input is not lost or disregarded simply because a new application has been initiated?
15.1.1 Will all previous submissions, objections and the associated Comments and Responses Report be incorporated into the current assessment record, with outstanding concerns explicitly identified and addressed?
15.1.2 Will previously registered I&APs be notified and invited to participate in the new process?
15.1.3 How will the applicant demonstrate continuity and accountability in public participation, particularly where environmental, social and cumulative impacts raised in the earlier process remain relevant?
Q15.2 Why were no open days held in Still Bay, Gouritsmond, Gqeberha or Cape Town? Will additional sessions at times fishers can attend be held, and will the comment period be extended for those unable to attend?
Q15.3 Will specialist findings, and not only the NTS, be available in isiXhosa and Afrikaans, in audio and in plain language? How will access to technical information, data costs and travel costs be addressed?
Q15.4 How will the process distinguish meaningful participation from notification and attendance records, demonstrate that community knowledge has changed the identification of impacts and alternatives, and respect communities’ cultural and spiritual relationship with the sea, as Sustaining the Wild Coast requires?
Q15.6 What safeguards (independent chairing, verbatim recording, a rule against linking attendance to job prospects, protection of participants from intimidation) will apply, and will minutes be returned to attendees for correction?
Q15.7 Which organs of state (including the DFFE Oceans and Coasts, Fisheries Management and Biodiversity branches, SAMSA, SAHRA, CapeNature, SANBI and the affected municipalities) have commented, and will their comments be made public in the FESIAR?
Q15.9 How will the process enable the decision-maker to meet the procedural fairness requirements of s 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000?
16. WHAT ONO REQUIRES THE FESIAR TO PROVIDE
In light of the above, ONO requests that the FESIAR to expressly provide for:
16.1.a dedicated climate assessment covering lifecycle and downstream emissions and their significance (Section 4);
16.2 independent marine ecological, biodiversity, ichthyoplankton and animal wellbeing studies (Sections 5 and 7)
16.3 assessment of routine discharges, chemical toxicity, noise, accidental releases and major incident scenarios, including offshore quantitative risk assessment and independent peer review of spill modelling (Sections 7 to 9)
16.4 a detailed spatial assessment with coordinates, maps and alternative locations, layouts and technologies (Section 6)
16.5 a cumulative impact assessmen
16.6 a strategic assessment of:
16.6.1 offshore petroleum development (Section 11);cultural and economic assessment covering small-scale and subsistence fishers
16.6.2 cultural and economic assessment covering small-scale and subsistence fishers
16.6.3 customary relationships,
16.6.4 tourism,
16.7 a full cost-benefit analysis and the distribution of benefits and costs (Sections 3 and 12)
16.8 a comparative assessment of alternative development pathways, including the no-go alternative (Section 3)
16.9 assessment of ageing infrastructure, decommissioning options, financial security and long-term liability (Sections 10 and 13)
16.10 explicit application of the legal framework, including ICMA’s public trust provisions, the Biodiversity Act’s animal wellbeing provisions and the two recent Constitutional Court judgments (Section 2)
16.11disclosure of methods, evidence, assumptions, uncertainty and residual risk (Section 14); and
16.12 public participation at the stages when substantive findings, alternatives and recommendations remain open (Section 15).
17. CONCLUSION
ONO objects to this application. On the information in the NTS, the applicant has not shown that the development can proceed without unacceptable ecological harm, that its climate and cumulative impacts are compatible with South Africa’s obligations, or that offshore oil and gas expansion is a necessary, equitable and defensible pathway to development when set against alternative development pathways. Human error and extreme weather contributing to a disastrous release cannot be eliminated, and much is at stake. The precautionary principle indicates that Environmental Authorisation should not be granted unless the applicant can demonstrate otherwise through the investigations requested above.
ONO asks that the questions in this submission be incorporated into the FESIAR, that each receive a reasoned response in the Comments and Responses Report, and that ONO remain registered as an interested and affected party and be notified of all further documents, meetings and decisions. ONO reserves the right to comment further on the full DESIAR, the specialist studies, the FESIA Report as they become available.
