Aging Rig & Explosions for Pipelines in Pristine Area: ONO objects to TEEPSA 11B/12B
Whilst we appreciate the opportunity to comment on the TotalEnergies EP South Africa B.V. Scoping on the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and proposed public participation process for the proposed offshore production right and environmental authorisation applications for Block 11B/12B, let it be said that we are greatly troubled by the ‘development footprint’ of the proposed 10 appraisal wells, bathymetry and vertical seismic profiling, and construction of 109kms of subsea pipelines through a one-of-its-kind critical biodiversity region, that then connects to ageing facilities and infrastructure of the existing PetroSA F-A Platform.
The Oceans Not Oil coalition is categoric in its objection to this application, and says so for the following reasons:
- NEED AND DESIRABILITY OF THE PROJECT
a. There is a deeply flawed timeframe underpinning TEEPSA’s concept of energy transition to carbon neutrality. Exploration wells take up to ten years or more to complete; extraction anything from twenty to fifty years for completion (MacFayden & Watkins 2016) , which, situated on the Project Description Timeframes, would take activities well past 2050. To assume to be drilling wells in ten years from start-up makes the fundamental assumption that planetary tipping points and accelerating climatic events will wait, and that their consequential greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will be benign. The assumption that current climate conditions will remain stable is, at best, unrealistic and, at worst, catastrophic.
Last minute oil and gas production ambitions risk inconsistency with the South Africa’s binding carbon budget peak-plateau-decline emissions trajectory, pushing peaking well past Net Zero in 2050; thereby maintaining existing carbon lock-in inequalities whilst generating new ones (Atteridge & Strambo 2020; Kartha et al. 2019). As such this project is not aligned with global coalition for carbon neutrality by mid-century.
b. A recent study[i] by Lamboll, R.D., Nicholls, Z.R.J., Smith, C.J. et al (2023) has revealed that the remaining carbon budget – the net amount of carbon dioxide humans can still emit to retain a 50% chance of staying within 1.5°C of global heating – will be exhausted in the next six years of business-as-usual. The sudden acceleration of environmental crises in 2023 demonstrate the magnitude of future risk of continuing to extract fossil fuels, which demands the decision to abort this project in an effort to prevent this temperature threshold being breached.
c. The drilling pollutions including noise, discharged wastes, operational leaks and pipeline construction footprint expected from this proposed application could ruin the conservation efforts in the Critical Biodiversity Areas (Biodiversity Conservation, Restore and Impact Management Zones) irreparably/ forever. The impacts of both proposed pipeline routing options to the Critical Biodiversity Natural Area through which it’ll pass are significant(either 369 km2 or 415 km2 magnitudes).
i. Finn, Grattarola, & Pincheira‐Donoso’s recent research (2023) shows that 48% of the world’s species are declining in population size, while only 3% are rising. Given that we are living through an extinction crisis, where mass extinction is a symptom of Earth systems collapse, there being an existential need for preservation of these unique, diverse environments and their many vulnerable inhabitants to serve present and future generations.
According to Finn, Grattarola, & Pincheira‐Donoso, this, “extinction crisis is undergoing a rapid biodiversity imbalance, with levels of declines (a symptom of extinction) greatly exceeding levels of increases (a symptom of ecological expansion and potentially of evolution) for all groups. Our study contributes a further signal indicating that global biodiversity is entering a mass extinction, with ecosystem heterogeneity and functioning, biodiversity persistence, and human well-being under increasing threat[ii] ”.
d.The ESIA specialist reports have not been able to provide clear context of an “ecological sustainable development and justifiable economic and social development”[i] , instead they highlight the very clear jeopardy to the extremely biodiverse marine ecology, intangible heritage, subsistence and commercial fisheries are of high and medium significance; the tourism, recreation and hospitality industries could be devastated by an oiled coastline and that job opportunities for locals are minimal.
e. To frame this project, which continues to expand and sustain the use of fossil fuels, which in turn exacerbate global warming and extreme climate events, as consistent with NEMA principles and as if NEMA principles (quoted in 4.4 of the ESIA) will guide the ESIA process, is an abuse of public trust.
It has been shown that Total (branded now TotalEnergies) “personnel received warnings of the potential for catastrophic global warming from its products by 1971, became more fully informed of the issue in the 1980s, began promoting doubt regarding the scientific basis for global warming by the late 1980s, and ultimately settled on a position in the late 1990s of publicly accepting climate science while promoting policy delay or policies peripheral to fossil fuel control.”[iv]
WSP promotes a ‘future scenario’ TotalEnergies as environmentally responsible with claims that its oil-based business model will help contribute “to the country’s strategic objective of moving to a sustainable economy” and “serve as a bridge on the path from reliance on fossil fuel to carbon-neutrality from 2050” without TotalEnergies making actual changes to this model. This ESIA adds to TotalEnergies’ litany of denial and deflection of attention away from the willful global endangerment by promoting fossil fuel products.
Methane’s (CH4) considerably higher global warming potential than carbon dioxide (CO2) (Holmes et al., 2013) makes it a substantial contributor to climate change. 2014 estimates suggest that CH4 emissions from oil and gas processes account for approximately 20% of worldwide anthropogenic emissions[v]. Emissions from oil and gas production activities have increased from 65 to 80 TgCH4.yr-1 [vi], [vii] in the last 20 years[viii]. This escalation jeopardises the success of the Paris Agreement[ix]. Given the fact that the subject of any production right represents a significant threat to the environment and to biodiversity, not to mention the public’s constitutional right to an environment that is protected for the benefit of current and future generations, WSP lack of critical analysis in this regard demonstrates bias and an unjustifiable dereliction of duty.
f. This project has the potential to put the $8.5bn Just Energy Transition Partnership and future critical concessional loans, designed to support SA’s just transition from fossil fuels, at risk.
2. AGING INFRASTRUCTURE
a. The scoping report has not responded to Oceans Not Oil’s request for an explanation for the failure of offshore pipeline; its quantity of condensate lost and the extent of environmental contamination, in the PetroSA condensate pipeline running from the offshore FA platform to the GTL refinery in Mossel Bay, 2022. It stands as a precedent to this application; therefore it is imperative that the public is fully informed before further proceedings take place.
WSP claimed on 3 Feb 2023 that enquiries by TEEPSA had not had a response by the time the CRR was compiled; it is now 7 November 2023. I&APs have not been alerted nor informed via the ESIA. Please supply a full report.
b. The F-A Platform was installed in the late 1980’s, and given the metocean conditions of its site, it has likely outlived the 25-year design life of most rigs. It is now proposed that it continue functioning in ever more extreme conditions for another 27 years. Older structures are more prone to accidents, especially fires, and more dangerous for workers. According to a Wall Street Journal analysis of federal accident records, platforms that are 20 years old or more accounted for more than 60% of fires and nearly 60% of serious injuries aboard platforms in 2009[x].
c.The Climate Change Presentation lists sea level rise as a challenge to the F-A Platform of medium risk.
Of concern is that this report seems to understate the windspeeds in the area, projecting near sea surface wind speed for the southern offshore to remain relatively constant at 6.2 m/s for both the 2020 – 2039 and 2040 – 2060 periods. A study of 50 year hourly mean wind quantiles shows the higher strong wind velocities gusting in the 40–45 m/s category along the southwestern Cape coast[xi]. Metocean conditions probability of exceedance could be badly understated in this ESIA.
3. OUT-OF-KIND OFFSETS
The Scoping acknowledges that the pipeline transverses a significant portion of CBA natural and that oil and gas pipelines are not compatible with either CBA natural or CBA restore. The specialist proposes the use of an out-of-kind offset model proposing either research undertaken by TEEPSA or providing a funding allocation either to government, parastatal or non-government agency for research. This ‘trade-off’ is neither rational for the reasons stated in 1.c.i. nor is it a tactic that aligns with South Africa’s, or the marine community’s, long-term best interests.
4.SOCIO ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
a. TEEPSA must support the economic output figures ‘during production’, with a breakdown in analysis. According to Tutwa Consulting’s research (2021), South Africa does not possess the infrastructure needed to reap the potential benefits of any large discovery by TEEPSA. There are noteworthy infrastructural constraints facing the country. All four of South Africa’s oil refineries (with a total capacity of more than 500,000 barrels a day) have had accidents or are under review. The cost of such refinery upgrades was estimated at US $3.9 billion (in 2009 figures). The oil refining companies have expressed their unwillingness to invest in refinery upgrades because of the size of investments required, coupled with the absence of the guarantee that they are going to recover their investments fully.[xii] A pending national clean-fuels policy is also likely to increase costs to upgrade machinery.
b. Whilst the Economics Presentation acknowledges the very few local job opportunities offered by this application in numbers, it does not quantify the jobs and income lost from reduced catch rates in fisheries, during ongoing operations over the next 27 years.
c. The Social Impact Assessment boldly states that “financial compensation will be available should an unplanned event occur”, yet offers no examination of how levels of compensation for damages will be determined, nor how compensation and recovery efforts will be made sufficient to resolve not only financial and ecological, but also social impacts from hampered normal economic activities.
d.The Social Presentation shows that nearly a third (28.3%) of the Garden Route District Municipality consists of indigent households which will rely heavily on the natural environment for subsistence and social-cultural uses. Provisions for subsistence losses need to be placed in the compensatory framework, including the full spectrum of socio-cultural losses that may have an impact on social structure and community stability, and further erode productivity and economic participation. [xiii],[xiv],[xv],[xvi],[xvii],[xviii].
e.Considering the potential for massive pollution and environmental damage being present, a rigorous, independent and proactive Strategic Environmental Analysis (SEA) should be undertaken to inform the environmental viability of this offshore oil and gas proposal.
i.Please supply a SEA for this application.
f. Consequences of a blowout, or accidental release (and these happen as a matter of course during offshore operations) to marine and coastal ecosystems, tourism, fisheries and recreational industries need to be fully considered. Scientific assessment of the economic costs for adequate level of compensation for any damages incurred needs to be conducted to inform the planning process before disaster occurs and compensation is needed. This assessment needs to factor in the period of time recovery efforts and monetary compensation procedures take, and these consequences to the lives and livelihoods of claimants.
i.Please supply a rigorous Cost Benefit Analysis for this application.
5. LIABILITIES FOR OIL SPILL REMEDIATION
Considering the serious toll a spill would have on safe recreation at beaches, healthy habitats for wildlife, industries such as tourism and fishing, the South African taxpayer and the general public, the ESIA should produce proof of appropriate insurance safeguards TotalEnergies have in place for remediation against oil spills and other environmental damages and their reasonable level of fiscal readiness for long term clean-up and reparation process.
- Please indicate what insurance safeguards are in place in the event of accidental release.
- How is the insurance liability established if the value of this coastline has not been quantified.
6. MODELLING/OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLAN
a.The Oceans Not Oil coalition questions why conservatively higher rates were not used for the oil spill modelling if its purpose is to project a worst case-scenario. Real-world limitations of transporting and engaging the capping stack in the Southern Cape in heavy weather could realistically take longer than 20 days. Our request is that this oil spill modelling be peer reviewed by an independent specialist.
b. There is no modelling for recurrent small spills. Small spills have immediate adverse biological effects and their recurrent nature is likely to affect marine ecosystem functioning[xix].
c. WSP promised an Emergency Response Plan, Oil Spill Contingency Plan and Blow Out Contingency Plan will be developed as a standalone document for the project in 2 Feb 2023, which stakeholders have yet to be privy to. Stakeholders and I&APs should be able to engage on whether or not this plan provides sufficient protection to associated tourism, fisheries and businesses which rely on a healthy marine environment. Transparency is needed with regards to Oil Spill Response, Planning and Capacity necessary for public health and welfare as well as that of the marine and coastal environment.
The citizens of South Africa need assurance that incident management is fully informed and that South Africa has capacity to deal with the latest technology, practices and risks associated with, and due to, the different geological and ocean environments being explored, prior to the commencement of drilling.
d. The Scoping Report makes no mention of mitigation or contingency plans in the event of a fire or explosions. The Chevron Nigeria Limited explosion of January 2012 and the Gunashli oilfield disaster of December 2015 are indicators of the dire need for proper mitigation planning. Please make these plans public.
e.Oil Spill Contingency Plan (OSCP) for Subsea and Surface Release, detailing Oil Spill Response, including the Blowout Management Protocol, Planning and Capacity must include the possibility of more than one event; and must be made available for proper stakeholder and I&AP engagement.
7. LACK OF ASSESSMENT OF ONSHORE ENVIRONMENT AND MITIGATION
WSP also promised if the modelling results show a high probability of significant shoreline oiling, a follow up assessment could be conducted to examine cross-shore distribution and effect of shoreline morphodynamics on resurfacing of buried oil in more detail. The model has shown that a significant part of the Garden Route coastline could get oiled. The ESIA should have assessed the cross-shore distribution of stranded and persistent oils found in deeper layer of shoreline sediments to help optimize beach clean-up planning.
8. LACK DISPERSANT USE PLAN CLARIFICATION
a.The ESIA has not listed the most appropriate dispersants nor any explanation of their chemical components, toxicity, and potential for bioaccumulation, ecological impacts through the water column and on the shoreline.
b.There are many situations where the net environmental benefits of chemical dispersion are not clear, so effects to local flora and fauna must be indicated for all potential choices of dispersant should have been assessed and made available for stakeholder engagement in order for regulators to confidently decide on dispersant use issues.
c. Developers have not provided proof of immediate availability of dispersants considering this is of primary importance in effecting recovery rates.
9. EXPLOSIVE USE
The Scoping has not detailed the use of explosives, the mitigation against the extremely high risk to marine fauna and flora in their use, nor who holds the permits in terms of use of explosives for these operations.
10. BIASED, UNFAIR & UNDEMOCRATIC PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS
Numerous contentious issues with this EIA process raised by the Oceans Not Oil coalition were not addressed in the scoping report, with WSP distancing itself from its own undemocratic management of the public participation process, tightly restricting the types of issues that are open for discussion, narrowing the scope for public influence and as such WSP have failed to comply with the EIA requirements as set out in NEMA and the EIA Regulations.
a. Loudhailing by municipal councillors was witnessed on the 16th and 18th of January in the Kwanonqaba formal settlement in Mossel Bay and in the Thembalethu formal settlement in George, announcing that jobs were available should the public arrive, sign in and attend the public meetings for this BLOCK 11B/12B application (Annexure A & B).
Furthermore, at the Thembalethu public meeting on 18 January 2023 a participant approached the microphone saying that most of the people present at the meeting only came because they were promised jobs, but that they were confused by the stakeholder engagement because it had nothing to do with the jobs. Feeling that they had been misled, many left the meeting thereafter.
This inducement of the community in an effort to tick box a public participation meeting does not constitute meaningful engagement of the community by WSP.
b. WSP did not democratically or fairly manage the Thembalethu public meeting on 18 January 2023 to prevent intimidation and racist comments by an ANC Councillor from Mossel Bay, of those who asked difficult questions or who offered critique. The same councillor threatened one participant outside physically. (Annexure A & B)
c. WSP consultants refused to include all inputs by participants on their whiteboard flipchart notes and when questioned about this, WSP declared the comments invalid. These inputs that were deemed “invalid” were critical of the project. (Annexure A & B)
As such WSP has failed to follow a procedurally fair process in accordance with Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, (PAJA). Section 3(1) (a) of PAJA requires a procedurally fair process for administrative decision-making. This includes a reasonable opportunity to make representations about the subject matter being considered (section 3(2) (b)(1)). This opportunity to make representations, and is linked to the model of participatory and representative democracy in this country.
11. LACK OF EFFECTIVE MODELLING FOR VERTICAL SEISMIC PROFILING NOISE, PRESSURE EMISSIONS & SONAR PROFILING SURVEYS
a. Impacts of Sonar profiling surveys is not detailed. These are known to have significantly deleterious effects to cetaceans.
b. This application has a duration potentially spanning 27 years of noise pollution. Neither this fact, nor its cumulative effects, have been considered.
Cumulative acoustic limits should be established, since there is a very real risk of displacement from feeding or breeding areas which could have far reaching effects not only for whole, and vulnerable, animal populations, but also on the fishing sector and our food security. These limits should be appropriately matched to the spatiotemporal scale and exposure rate of the risks to individuals and populations. Measurement of noise budget, such as those under consideration under the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive (Tasker et al. 2010), should lead to limits on the source levels that are introduced on a regional scale.
c. For noise modelling to consider a” worst-case scenario being where an animal is exposed to drilling noise for the entire 24 hours” or “ exposure to drilling noise of 30-minute period, assuming the likelihood that an animal would move away from the source of the noise” is worryingly unprofessional.
d. Cumulative acoustics limits for relevant species should have been established for the following:
i.Multi beam echo-sounder (70-100 kHz)
ii. Single beam echo-sounder (38-200 kHz)
iii. Sub-bottom profiler (2-16 kHz)
iv. Vertical Seismic Profiling (please confirm the relevant Hz range)
v. Sea bed coring
vi. Noise from the rig
vii.Noise from the many vessels operating simultaneously
viii. Combinations of i-vii occurring simultaneously
For all the reasons stated above, the Oceans Not Oil believes the proposed exploration poses an unacceptable ecological and socio-economic threat for present and future South Africans. Human error and extreme weather contributing to a disastrous release cannot be completely eradicated and much is at stake. The precautionary principle indicates that Environmental Authorization should not be issued.
[i] In the Appendix E11TEEPSA Comments Response Register
[i] Lamboll, R.D., Nicholls, Z.R.J., Smith, C.J. et al. Assessing the size and uncertainty of remaining carbon budgets. Nat. Clim. Chang. (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01848-5
[ii] Finn, C., Grattarola, F., & Pincheira‐Donoso, D. (2023). More losers than winners: investigating Anthropocene defaunation through the diversity of population trends. Biological Reviews
[iii] In the Appendix E11TEEPSA Comments Response Register
[iv] Bonneuil, C., Choquet, P. L., & Franta, B. (2021). Early warnings and emerging accountability: Total’s responses to global warming, 1971–2021. Global Environmental Change, 71, 102386.
[v] Nara, H., Tanimoto, H., Tohjima, Y. et al. (2014). Emissions of methane from offshore oil and gas platforms in Southeast Asia. Sci Rep 4, 6503. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep06503
[vi] Varon, D. J., Jervis, D., McKeever, J., Spence, I., Gains, D., and Jacob, D. J. (2021). High-frequency monitoring of anomalous methane point sources with multispectral Sentinel-2 satellite observations, Atmos. Meas. Tech., 14, 2771–2785, https://doi.org/10.5194/amt-14-2771-2021.
[vii] Cusworth, D. H., Duren, R. M., Thorpe, A. K., Pandey, S., Maasakkers, J. D., Aben, I., … & Miller, C. E. (2021). Multi-satellite imaging of a gas well blowout enables quantification of total methane emissions. Geophysical Research Letters, 48(2), e2020GL090864.
[viii] IEA (2022). Methane Tracker. International Energy Agency, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/methane-tracker (accessed 21 Jan 2023).
[ix] Nisbet, E. G., Fisher, R. E., Lowry, D., France, J. L., Allen, G., Bakkaloglu, S., et al. (2020). Methane mitigation: methods to reduce emissions, on the path to the Paris agreement. Reviews of Geophysics, 58, e2019RG000675. https://doi.org/10.1029/2019RG000675
[x]Casselman, B. Aging Oil Rigs, Pipelines Expose Gulf to Accidents. (Dec. 14, 2010). The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704584804575644463302701660#
[xi] Kruger, A. C., Retief, J. V., & Goliger, A. M. (2013). Strong winds in South Africa: Part 2 Mapping of updated statistics. Journal of the South African Institution of Civil Engineering= Joernaal van die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Siviele Ingenieurswese, 55(2), 46-58.
[xii] Ms. Vania Mahotas, DMRE, Deputy Director: Petroleum Regulation, Hydrocarbons Policy “South African National Workshop on Implementation of Marpol Vi On 0.50% Sulphur Limit : Cleaner Fuels Strategy”, 24 July 2019: http://www.samsa.org.za/Documents/Marpol%202019/South%20Africa%27s%20Clean%20Fuels%20Strategy.pdf
[xiii] Rodin, M., M. Downs, J. Petterson, and J. Russell. 1992. Community impacts resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Organization and Environment 6(3):219-234. http://dx.doi. org/10.1177/108602669200600304
[xiv] Rhoan, E. 2011. The rightful position: the BP oil spill and the Gulf Coast tribes. San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review 20:173-192. [outline] URL: http://www.sjcl.edu/campus/images/ stories/sjalr/volumes/V20N1C7.pdf
[xv] Palinkas, L. A., M. A. Downs, J. S. Petterson, and J. Russell. 1993. Social, cultural, and psychological impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Human Organization 52:1-13.
[xvi] Martin, G. 1999. Valdez spill leaves bitter residue: oil is gone after 10 years, but ecological, economic fallout continues. San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco, California, USA. [online] URL: http:// http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Valdez-Spill-Leaves-Bitter-Residue- Oil-is-gone-2940197.php
[xvii] Fall, J. A., R. Miraglia, W. Simeone, C. J. Utermohle, and R. J. Wolfe. 2001. Long-term consequences of the Exxon Valdez oil spill for coastal communities of Southcentral Alaska (Technical Paper 264). Department of Fish and Game, Department of Subsistence, Juneau, Alaska, USA. [online] URL: http://www.arlis.org/docs/ vol1/A/47170529.pdf
[xviii] Esclamado, L. 2011. Ensuring justice : claiming livelihood for communities in the U.S. Gulf Coast after the BP oil spill disaster. Michigan Journal of Social Work and Social Welfare II(I):24-38. [online] URL: http://mjsw.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/vol1-iss1- sp11-esclamado.pdf
[xix] Brussard, C. P. D., Beggah, S., Wick, L. Y., Wuerz, B. Weber, J., Arey, J.S., van der Burg, B., Jonas, A., Huisman, J. Roelof van der Meer, J., 2016. Immediate ecotoxicological effects of short-lived oil spills on marine. Nature Communications, 7 (11206).
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